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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
RICHARD R. HOPKINS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20020432-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction of issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999), in the Second Judicial District Court, 
Davis County, Utah, the Honorable Glen R. Dawson presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Issue No. 1: Whether the trial court should have adopted defendant's strict 
interpretations of Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), in 
determining defendant's guilt 
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] reviews for correctness a [lower] 
court's statutory interpretation, according it no particular deference." State v. Singh, 819 
P.2d 356, 359 (Utah App. 1991) (citations omitted). 
Issue No. 2: Whether the clear weight of the evidence, including defendant's 
concession that his account balance was insufficient to cover the checks he issued, 
supported the trial court's judgment beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the 
evidence, [an appellate court] must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against 
the clear weight of the evidence, or if [the appellate court] otherwise reach[es] a definite 
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 
UT App 277, f4, 12 P.3d 108 (citations and quotations omitted). 
Issue No. 3: Whether Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) is constitutionally sound in 
its purpose and application. 
Standard of Review: Where a constitutional challenge presents a question of law, 
it is reviewed for correctness. State v. One 1980 Cadillac, 2001 UT 26, f 8,21 P.3d 212. 
Issue No. 4: Whether defendant's claim that his disclosure to the victim that there 
may be problems with check 172 was a complete defense for having issued checks 172 
and 191 without sufficient funds. 
Standard of Review: "[An appellate court] will not set aside a trial court's 
findings of fact unless those findings are clearly erroneous." Greenwood v. City of North 
Salt Lake, 817 P.2d 816, 818 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following are found in Addendum A. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-204 (1999); 
2 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999); 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-106 (1999); 
Utah R. App. P. 24; 
Utah Const. Art. I, § 16.. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by information with issuing a bad check or draft, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505 (1999). R. 1-2,17-18,66-67. 
At the preliminary hearing, that charge was reduced to a third degree felony pursuant to 
section 76-6-505(3)(c). See R. 63-64. After a bench trial, defendant was convicted as 
charged. R. 140-41; 184:204-06. The trial court sentenced defendant to a statutory 
indeterminate prison term of zero to five years. R. 144-47; 185:15-16. That sentence was 
suspended, however, and defendant was ordered to serve a statutory probationary term of 
thirty-six months, pay $2,219.85 in restitution to the victim, and complete 200 hours of 
community service. Id. Defendant timely appealed. R. 154-55. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS' 
On 9 February 2001 and again on 26 February 2001, defendant, a seasoned 
businessman and attorney and the president of Cornerstone Publishing & Distribution, 
Inc. ("Cornerstone"), issued two paychecks totaling $2,127.85 to Julie Vanisi for services 
rendered as an employee of Cornerstone, knowing that the company bank account had 
insufficient funds to cover the checks. See R. 184:32-51,148-50, 154-55. The two 
'The facts are recited in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings. See 
Spanish Fork v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ^2, 975 P.2d 501. 
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checks were subsequently dishonored by the bank and remain unpaid. See R. 184:98-99, 
156. 
* * * 
In August 2000, acting as the president of Cornerstone, defendant purchased 
Horizon Publishers and Distributors, Inc. ("Horizon") from Dwayne Crowther. R. 
184:13-16,126-30,154. At that time, Horizon had at least nine employees, including 
Julie Vanisi, each of whom became employees of Cornerstone after the sale. R. 184:20; 
148. Julie's duties for Cornerstone included, assisting with accounts payable, accounts 
receivable, and payroll. R- 184:21-22,54-57.2 
On 8 September 2000, defendant set up a business checking account in 
Cornerstone's name at U.S. Bank. R. 184:17-18,76-77,150. At that time, defendant was 
made aware of the bank's fees for returned checks. R. 184:96. Defendant was the only 
individual authorized to sign on the account. R. 184:150,162. 
Defendant maintained an office on site and managed Cornerstone's business on a 
daily basis. R. 184:17. When Cornerstone began generating revenue, defendant 
personally tallied the checks received, prepared the deposit receipts, and deposited the 
checks into the corporate checking account R. 184:55. Defendant also received the 
account statements and performed the account reconciliation. R. 184:55,150-51,160-61. 
Although Julie assisted in generating the payroll, defendant personally held the 
2Julie reported that she had a good working relationship with defendant. R. 
184:23, 70-71. In fact, between September and October 2000, rather than have her leave 
the company for a higher paying job, defendant gave Julie a raise in her hourly wages. R. 
184:21,23,56. 
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company checkbook and would approve and sign the paychecks. R. 184:23,29. The pay 
periods were scheduled on the 10th and 25th days of each month, or the work day before 
if the payday fell on a weekend. R. 184:23. Usually, defendant would hand-deliver the 
paychecks to his employees on paydays. R. 184: 29-30. The company did not use direct 
deposit banking. R. 184:30. 
In December 2000, Cornerstone began having financial difficulties. R. 184:130-
44,166. Bank statements reflected that the following number of checks failed to clear 
Cornerstone's account: twenty-seven checks during December 2000, twenty-six during 
January 2001, and forty-eight checks during February 2001. R. 184:87-88; State's 
Exhibits 1,2, and 3. From December through February 2001, defendant made daily 
telephone calls to the bank's automated telephone line to find out the account's current 
balance. R. 184:152. 
On 8 February 2001 the corporate checking account had an ending balance of 
$28.56. R. 184:84; State's Exhibit 3. Despite the account balance, the next day 
defendant signed and issued Julie a paycheck ("check 172") in the amount of $1,021.64. 
R. 184:32-34; State's Exhibit 8.3 Defendant issued paychecks to the other employees that 
same day. R. 184:60-62. When he handed check 172 to Julie, defendant asked her not to 
cash it but to deposit it and "let it go through the system." R. 184:58, 61-62. Julie did as 
defendant requested, and presented the check for deposit at her credit union that same 
day. R. 184:34-36. 
3The record indicates that Cornerstone's account balance on 9 February 2001 was 
$5.81. R. 184:84; State's Exhibit 3. 
5 
Seven days later, on 15 February, Julie received a telephone call from her credit 
union informing her that check 172 had been refused by U.S. Bank for non-sufficient 
funds. R. 184:35-36. She asked the credit union to hold the check until the next day and 
then present it again. Id. On 16 February and again on 20 February Julie received 
additional calls from her credit union indicating that further attempts to present check 172 
to U.S. bank had failed. Id. At that point, Julie met with defendant and informed him of 
the returned check. R. 184:36-38. Defendant told her that he would take care of it. R. 
184:38. 
On Friday, 23 February, Cornerstone's checking account had an ending balance of 
$998.75. R. 184:84; State's Exhibit 3. Yet the following Monday, 26 February, 
regardless of the fact that check 172 was still outstanding and that the current balance was 
insufficient to cover another paycheck, defendant issued a paycheck ("check 191") to 
Julie in the amount of $1,106.21. R. 184:85; State's Exhibit 4.4 
The next day, rather than take check 191 to her credit union, Julie took it to U.S. 
Bank. R. 184:46-47. Upon presentment, the teller refused the check and informed Julie 
that Cornerstone's checking account contained insufficient funds to cover the check. R. 
184:47. Julie went back to U.S. Bank on 28 February and was again informed that the 
check would not clear. R. 184:48. At that time, a bank officer typed "Non Sufficient 
Funds" on the face of check 191, dated it, stamped the bank's name and address on the 
check, and returned it to Julie. R. 184:48-49; State's Exhibit 4. 
4The record indicates that Cornerstone's account balance on 26 February 2001 was 
$170.89. R. 184:85; State's Exhibit 3. 
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At trial, defendant admitted that according to the ending balances listed on the 
February bank statement, neither check 172 nor check 191 would have cleared 
Cornerstone's checking account on any day during that month. R. 184:168-69. At the 
end of February 2001, defendant terminated Julie's employment. R. 184:26. Several 
months after issuing Julie's paychecks, defendant declared bankruptcy. R. 184:125. 
Although defendant paid the other employee's outstanding paychecks prior to declaring 
bankruptcy, both of Julie's checks remained unpaid R. 184:156,180-82; 185:1-2. 
ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
POINT I: Arguing that the trial court should have adopted his strict interpretation 
of Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), defendant claims that the 
trial court misinterpreted the statute. Under his interpretation of the statute, defendant 
claims that he did not possess the requisite mens rea or act within the other elements of 
the statute. Defendant fails, however, to show that his reading of the statute is in 
harmony with its plain language and with legislative intent As opposed to the trial 
court's interpretation, defendant's construction results in a nonsensical and unreasonable 
reading of section 76-6-505(1) which runs contrary to the statute's clear legislative 
purpose. 
POINT Hi Defendant also contends that the evidence adduced at trial was 
insufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that he knowingly issued two bad 
paychecks to the victim. That argument assumes that defendant's interpretation of the 
statute is correct. However, under the trial court's correct interpretation of section 76-6-
7 
505(1), defendant's claim fails. The clear weight of the evidence proves that defendant 
knowingly issued more checks than there were funds in his account. 
POINT III: Defendant next claims that section 76-6-505(1) is unconstitutional in 
that it impermissibly punishes debtors and violates his due process rights. Because the 
clear purpose of section 76-6-505(1) is to punish intentional overdrafts and not to 
imprison debtors, defendant's claim fails, Additionally, given this Court's required 
presumption against unconstitutionality, defendant's failure to adequately brief or 
otherwise meet his heavy burden of proving unconstitutionality, and the clarity of section 
76-6-505(1), defendant fails to show that the statute is unconstitutional. 
POINT IV: Finally, defendant argues that he should have been given the benefit 
of his alleged disclosure to the victim to hold her checks for a few days before cashing 
them, as a complete defense to the charge. Not only is this claim inadequately briefed, 
but the record refutes defendant's claim that his defense is absolute. The record shows 
that defendant only offered that disclosure with regard to check 172. Even if the trial 
court were to find that defendant's claim was valid with regard to check 172, he could 
still have been convicted for issuing check 191. Therefore, defendant's alleged defense is 
incomplete. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant was charged by information under both subsections (1) and (2) of 
Utah's bad check statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505, which describe variants of the 
offense of issuing a bad check or draft. See R. 1-2, 17-18, 66-67; Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
8 
505(1) and (2) (1999). After a bench trial, defendant was convicted as charged—under 
both subsections of the statute. SeeR. 140-41; 184:204-06. The trial court issued 
findings under subsection (1) and (2) in support of its judgment. See R. 184:204-06. 
Based on the trial court's ruling, defendant's conviction may be upheld under subsection 
(1) or (2) or both.5 For that reason, although defendant's arguments pertaining to section 
76-6-505(2) lack merit, the State need only respond to defendant's claims under 76-6-
505(1) as found in Points I, II, and IV, and Point III subsections C and D of defendant's 
brief. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S INTERPRETATION OF UTAH'S BAD 
CHECK STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1), 
RUNS CONTRARY TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND 
TO THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE 
Defendant claims that in convicting him of issuing a bad check the trial court 
incorrectly interpreted subsection (1) of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505. See Br. of Aplt. at 
20-21,28-31. That subsection provides: 
Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, 
for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the 
drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad 
check or draft. 
5Cf. State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1159 (Utah 1991) (as opposed to a bench 
trial where findings are issued on each element, "a general jury verdict cannot stand if the 
State's case was on more than one factual or legal theory of the elements of the crime and 
any one of those theories is flawed or lacks the requisite evidentiary foundation. In such 
circumstances it is impossible to determine whether the jury agreed unanimously on all of 
the elements of a valid and evidentially supported theory of the elements of the crime."). 
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Utah Code Ann. 76-6-505(1) (1999). 
Although scattered throughout his brief, defendant's statutory interpretation claim 
is essentially threefold: (1) in Point I subsection C, defendant claims that the phrase 
"knowing it will not be paid" should have been interpreted to include knowledge that a 
specific check will not be paid, see Br. of Aplt. at 21-23; (2) in Point I subsections B and 
D of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court should have interpreted the terms 
"knowing"and "obtaining" to include dishonesty as an element of the crime, see Br. of 
Aplt. at 20-21,23-25; and (3) in Point II subsections A and B, defendant claims that the 
trial court misinterpreted the phrase "paying for any . . . wages" to be an alternative 
element to "obtaining... any. . . thing of value," and that his conduct fell outside the 
"obtaining" element, see Br. of Aplt at 25-31. Each of defendant's claims lack merit 
When faced with an issue of statutory interpretation, "[an appellate court's] 
primary obligation is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the plain 
language, in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve." State v. Burns, 2000 
UT 56, f 25,4 P.3d 795. Accordingly, an appellate court presumes that the legislature 
used each term of a statute advisedly, and only looks beyond the plain language if it is 
ambiguous. State v. Chancy, 1999 UT App 309, <|22,989 P.2d 1091; Burns, 2000 UT 56, 
125.6 
6In Point I subsection A of his brief, defendant states that as a "rule of statutory 
construction, the requirements of [Utah Code Ann] § 76-6-505(1)... must be liberally 
construed in [his] favorf.]" Br. of Aplt. at 20. However, defendant cites no Utah law, and 
the State is aware of none, in support of that proposition. Under Utah law, although this 
Court must review the trial court's statutory interpretation for correctness, affording it no 
deference, its "primary obligation is to give effect to the legislative intent as evidenced by 
10 
A. Defendant's act of writing numerous checks on insufficient funds fails within 
the legislative intent of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1). 
In Point I subsection C of his brief, defendant claims that the trial court should 
have strictly construed the phrase "knowing it will not be paid" in section 76-6-505(1) to 
mean that he must have had knowledge that a "specific check" will not be honored by the 
drawee at the time of issuance. Br. of Aplt. at 21-23,25. Essentially, defendant claims 
that the act of writing as many checks as one wants based on future income while 
knowing that some of the checks will not clear the account is not a criminal offense under 
section 76-6-505(1). This interpretation leads to ludicrous results. 
Section 76-6-505(1) reveals that the clear legislative purpose of the statute is to 
prevent the negotiation and delivery of worthless instruments into commerce, or in other 
words, to prevent intentional overdrafts. See State v. Berry, 358 So.2d 545, 545 (Fla. 
1978) (purpose of bad check statute is to "ban[] the circulation of worthless commercial 
paper because of the danger it poses to the flow of tradef.]"). The statute states that the 
issuance of a bad check "knowing it will not be paid by the drawee" is a punishable 
offense. Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-505(1) (1999). A person who acts "knowingly" is one 
who "is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances," and who "is 
aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
103 (1999). Accordingly, the phrase "knowing it will not be paid by the drawee" clearly 
refers to the payor's knowledge that any check may not be honored at issuance. See id.\ 
the [statute's] plain language." Burns, 2000 UT 56, % 25; State v. McGee, 2001 UT 69, «| 
6,31 P.3d531. 
11 
see also State v. McHugh, 697 P.2d 466,469-71 (Mont 1985) (knowledge that some 
checks may not clear an account clearly falls within the "knowing" element of Montana's 
bad check statute, Mont Code Ann. § 45-6-316 (1985)). 
Defendant's statutory interpretation runs contrary to the Legislature's purpose of 
preventing overdrafts. See State v. Martinez, 2000 UT App 320, f6,14 P.3d 114 ("It is a 
fundamental rule of statutory interpretation... that a statute be looked at in its entirety 
and in accordance with the purpose which was sought to be accomplished/*) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Under defendant's interpretation, an individual who 
does not have any form of check protection may write checks based future income rather 
than actual funds. Also, one could legally write numerous checks knowing that there are 
only sufficient funds in the checking account to cover a portion of those checks. That 
reading of section 76-6-505(1) would encourage rather than prevent overdrafts. 
In addition, under defendant's interpretation, the State would be required to prove 
that defendant knew the exact time when the payee would present the check to the drawee 
bank. Because such knowledge is privy only to the payee, such an element would be 
impossible to prove. Accordingly, defendant's strict interpretation leads to an unfair 
result which conflicts with the Legislature's general intent See Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
106 (1999) ("The rule that a penal statute? is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state . . . [rather, the 
statutes] shall be construed according to the fair import of their terms[.]"); State v. 
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Christensen, 2001 UT 14, f 5,20 P.3d 329 (strict construction rule not applicable to 
criminal cases). 
Moreover, defendant's interpretation nullifies any legal effect of section 76-6-
505(1). The only reasonable reading of section 76-6-505(1) is that one must have money 
in his or her account or overdraft protection when the check is issued to avoid violating 
the statute. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505( 1) (1999). In other words, if the payor 
knows at the time of issuance that his account contains insufficient funds and yet 
continues to write checks, the payor is in violation of section 76-6-505(1). See id. Under 
defendant's interpretation, numerous overdrafts would not punishable, and the statute 
would have no legal effect Accordingly, defendant's claim fails. 
B. In light of the Legislature's exclusion of "intent to defraud" as an element of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), defendant's claim that "dishonesty" is an 
essential element is frivolous, and in any event, defendant's conduct was 
dishonest 
Next, in Point I subsections B and D of his brief, defendant argues that the terms 
"knowing"and "obtaining" as found in section 76-6-505(1) should have been read to 
require a showing of "dishonesty" as an essential element in issuing a bad check. Br. of 
Aplt. at 20-21. Essentially, defendant claims that he cannot be convicted under section 
76-6-505(1) because his conduct was not dishonest. See id. Defendant's claim is 
frivolous. 
State v. Delmotte, 665 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983), rebuts defendant's argument. In 
Delmotte, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that the Legislature specifically intended 
that section 76-6-505(1) not require a showing of "intent to defraud." Id. at 1315; see 
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Black's Law Dictionary, 324 (6th ed. abr. 1995) (defining the term "dishonesty" as 
"[disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud") (emphasis added). Instead, the Supreme 
Court held that "[t]he element of 'knowledge' of the overdraft is now sufficient to support 
a conviction." Delmotte, 665 P.2d at 1315.7 Accordingly, in light of Delmotte's rejection 
of dishonesty or fraud as an element of section 76-6-505(1), defendant's claim clearly 
fails. 
In any event, defendant's conduct was dishonest Although defendant told Julie 
that he would "take care of* or "cover" checks 172 and 191, he never did* See R. 184:38, 
155-56. Instead, he terminated her employment and declared bankruptcy. R. 184:26, 
125. However, prior to declaring bankruptcy, defendant paid the other employees who 
complained of returned paychecks. SeeR. 148; 184:180-82. Only Julie's checks 
remained unpaid See 184:156; 185:1*2. Despite having been the benefactor of Julie's 
work-services performed between January and February 2001, defendant only offered to 
pay any bank fees or costs that might have arisen as the result of issuing the bad checks. 
See R. 185:1-2. Accordingly, the record reflects that defendant's conduct was dishonest. 
7Although defendant cites to Delmotte, he fails to offer any case analysis. See Br. 
of Aplt. at 21. Instead, defendant relies on State v. Pfannenstiel, 448 P.2d 346 (Utah 
1968), a case that predates significant amendments made to Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
505(1) in 1977, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1999), and several old cases from 
other jurisdictions whose statutes require a showing of intent to defraud. See Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 21-3707 (2002) (requiring a showing of intent to defraud); State v. Parsons, 398 
S.W.2d 283 (Tex Crim. App. 1966) (intent to defraud is an essential element of Texas' 
bad check statute); State v. Stoveken, 229 N.W. 2d 224, 226 (Wis. 1975) (intent to 
defraud is an element of Wisconsin's bad check statute). Accordingly, those cases have 
no relevance to the present matter. 
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C. Under the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1), the trial court 
correctly found that defendant satisfied the "paying for any . . . wages" 
element of the statute. 
Finally, in Point II subsections A and B of his brief, defendant attacks the trial 
court's findings, claiming that the court misinterpreted the statutory phrases "obtaining .. 
• any . . . thing of value" and "paying for any . . . wages." Br. of Aplt. at 25-31. 
Essentially, defendant claims the trial court should have applied the word "obtaining" as a 
contemporaneous element. See Br. of Aplt. at 25-27. In other words, defendant argues 
that his conduct fell outside section 76-6-505(1) because he had already received Julie's 
work-services when he issued her paychecks, and therefore, he could not have 
contemporaneously "obtained" anything at that time. See id. Additionally, defendant 
claims that the phrase "or paying for any. . . wages" is not intended to define something 
separate from a "thing of value," and therefore, not an alternative to the "obtaining" 
element. See id. Defendant's interpretation of section 76-6-505(1) is nonsensical and 
runs contrary to legislative intent 
At the bench trial, after hearing all the evidence and having carefully reviewed 
section 76-6-505, the trial found that defendant issued Julie's paychecks. R. 184:204-05. 
The court then made the following findings: 
The purpose of each of the checks at issue was a purpose set out in 
[76-6-505(1) and (2)]; that is, paying for wages, salary, labor. And with 
regard to subsection [1], the issue is whether [defendant] knew it would not 
be paid by the drawee. And as I review State's Exhibits 1, 2, and 3, the 
bank statements that show numerous bounced checks in December, January 
and February, as I review the testimony that—that numerous employees 
were told that, you know, don't try to cash this. Just deposit it. we're 
confident it will pass. That showed knowledge that there was a problem. 
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And I think it's sufficient to show knowledge that an given check may not 
be paid by the drawee. 
It's clear with regard to these two checks, they were refused by the 
drawee and the defendant's conduct was knowing. It was also extremely 
reckless with regard to the state of the business as testified to during the 
time at issue, February of 2001. And I find that all of the elements of 
subsection 1 of 76-6-505 have been shown by proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
R. 184:205-06. Accordingly, the trial court found that defendant issued checks 172 and 
191 in payment for Julie's wages. See id. This finding is consistent with the plain 
language of section 76-6-505(1). 
The relevant language of section 76-6-505(1) provides that "[a]ny person who 
issues... a check... for the payment of money, for the purpose of obtaining from any 
person... any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for. . . wages,... 
knowing it will not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty 
of issuing a bad check or draft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1999). Under the trial 
court's reading of the statute, one may issue a check for one of two purposes: "obtaining 
. . . any . . . thing of value or paying for. . . wages." Id. (emphasis added). 
Grammatically, that language can be read no other way. Defendant's interpretation 
would omit the "or" before "paying for. . . wages," resulting in awkward and nonsensical 
syntax. See State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,1 53,463 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 ("'[n]o... 
word shall be construed as superfluous, void, or insignificant if the construction can be 
found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute.'") (citation 
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omitted). The trial court's interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the 
statute as a whole, whereas defendant's interpretation is not. See Lyon v. Burton, 2000 
UT 55, fl7, 5 P.3d 616 ("The plain language of a statute is to be read as a whole, and its 
provisions interpreted in harmony with other provisions in the same statute . . ."). 
Additionally, defendant's claim that his conduct fell outside section 76-6-505(1) 
because he had "obtained" Julie's work-services prior to issuing her paychecks, leads to a 
result that is contrary to legislative intent. Section 76-6-505(1) expressly includes the 
phrase "paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
505(1). Usually, wages and salary are paid out after an employee has completed two 
work weeks. Accordingly, the phrase "paying for any . . . wages [or] salary" clearly 
indicates the Legislature's intent to punish the act of knowingly issuing a bad paycheck 
for prior services under section 76-6-505(1). See State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 492, 
493-94 (Utah App. 1993) (an appellate court "assumes 'the Legislature used each term 
advisedly, and [] give[s] effect to each term according to its ordinary and accepted 
meaning'") (citation omitted). Thus, defendant's interpretation of section 76-6-505(1) 
runs contrary to the legislative intent apparent within the language of the statute.8 
8In support of his argument, defendant compares section 76-6-505(1) to Utah Code 
Ann. § 7-15-1 (Supp. 2002). Br. of Aplt. at 30-31. However, section 7-15-1 is a civil 
statute, and therefore, is unhelpful in the instant case. See State v. Putnik, 2002 UT 122, ^ 
10, 463 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (refusing to rely on a case based on a civil statute). 
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POINT II 
WHERE DEFENDANT NEGLECTS TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL AND THE 
CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE TRIAL EVIDENCE 
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION, 
DEFENDANT'S CHALLENGE TO THE SUFFICIENCY 
OF THE EVIDENCE FAILS 
In Point I subsection C of his brief, defendant claims that under his interpretation 
of section 76-6-505(1), the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to show his knowledge 
that checks 172 and 191 would not clear Cornerstone's account. Br. of Aplt. 21-23.9 As 
shown in Point I subsection A above, defendant's interpretation of section 76-6-505(1) is 
incorrect. Accordingly, where defendant fails to marshal the evidence adduced at trial, 
and in any event, the clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's judgment, 
defendant's claim fails. 
A. Defendant fails to marshal the evidence. 
Defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court's judgement. 
See Utah R. App. Pro. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all 
record evidence that supports the challenged findings."). 
In West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Co., this Court held that "the 
marshaling concept does not reflect a desire merely to have pertinent excerpts from the 
9On appeal, defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence with respect 
to his knowledge that Julie's paychecks would not be honored by the bank. See Br. of 
Aplt. At 21-23. Defendant does not argue that the other elements of section 76-6-505(1) 
were not met. See id. In any event, the evidence adduced at trial clearly shows that 
defendant issued a paycheck to Julie in payment for her wages, and that U.S. Bank 
refused to offer payment on the checks. See R. 184:32-36, 48-49, 85, 98-99; State's 
Exhibits 4 and 8. 
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record readily available to a reviewing court." 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah App. 1991). 
Rather, the appellant must present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of 
competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." Id. 
After gathering "this magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret 
out a fatal flaw in the evidence." Id. 
Here, the only facts marshaled by defendant in support of his claim consist of a 
one-sentence statement: "[Defendant] knew the company was having problems with its 
account, and warned the employees that they might experience problems so they should 
deposit the checks to their own accounts and allow them to clear in the normal course of 
banking." Br. of Aplt. at 22. That single statement reveals defendant's complete failure 
to present "in comprehensive and fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence 
introduced at trial which supports the very findings [he] resists." Majestic Investment Co., 
818 P.2d at 1315. Accordingly, where defendant wholly fails to marshal the evidence 
adduced at trial, his claim fails. 
B. The clear weight of the evidence supports the trial court's decision. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to marshal the evidence adduced at trial, the 
clear weight of the evidence reveals that upon issuing checks 172 and 191, defendant 
knew that there were insufficient funds in Cornerstone's account to cover the checks. 
"When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, [an appellate court] 
must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of the 
evidence, or if [the appellate court] otherwise reach[es] a definite and firm conviction that 
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a mistake has been made." American Fork City v. Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, f 4, 12 P.3d 
108 (citing Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, J 5,975 P.2d 501) (quotations 
omitted). In other words, an appellate court must affirm if there is sufficient competent 
evidence as to each element of the charge to enable the trier of fact to determine, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 
278,282 (Utah App. 1998). 
Here, the evidence clearly reveals defendant's knowledge that checks 172 and 191 
would not be honored by the bank upon issuance. In December, two months prior to 
issuing checks 172 and 191, defendant became aware of Cornerstone's financial 
difficulties. See R. 184:130-44,166. In February, defendant met with his employees to 
explain Cornerstone's financial difficulties. SeeR. 184:62. At trial, defendant admitted 
that he received and reviewed the bank statements containing the account's daily ending 
balance. See R. 150-51. The bank statements indicated that twenty-seven checks failed 
to clear Cornerstone's account during December 2000, twenty-six during January 2001, 
and forty-eight checks during February 2001. R. 184:87-88; State's Exhibits 1,2, and 3. 
Defendant also admitted that he placed daily calls to the bank from December through 
February to review the account balance. See R. 184:150-52. Thus, the evidence shows 
that defendant was plainly aware of the low account balances (S28.56 on 8 February 2001 
and $998.75 on 23 February 2001) prior to his issuing Julie's February paychecks. See 
id. 
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Defendant's request that Julie not immediately cash check 172 also supports the 
fact that defendant knew that the paycheck had no value at the time of issuance. See R. 
184:58, 61-62. Moreover, because Julie and her credit union had previously brought the 
matter to defendant's attention, at the time defendant issued Julie's second paycheck 
(check 191) defendant had full knowledge that check 172 was still outstanding and had 
not yet cleared Cornerstone's account. See R. 184:36-38, 85, 164; State's Exhibit 4. In 
fact, at trial defendant admitted that according to the ending balances listed on the 
February bank statement, neither check 172 nor check 191 would have cleared 
Cornerstone's checking account on any day during February. R. 184:168-69. 
In addition to those facts, the surrounding circumstances also support defendant's 
conviction. See State v. McClain, 706 P.2d 603, 605 (Utah 1985) ("[IJntent to prove a 
crime 'may be inferred from the actions of the defendant or from surrounding 
circumstances.'") (citation omitted). Specifically, defendant gave no indication that he or 
the bank had made some kind of computation error, or that he had any arrangement for an 
extension of credit on Cornerstone's checking account which he intended to use. See R. 
184. Even though defendant made a deposit of $2,699.95 on 26 February 2001, that 
same day he immediately made several withdrawals amounting to $1,910, leaving a 
balance of only $789.95—an amount insufficient to cover check 191 in the amount of 
$1,106.21. See R. 184:94-95; State's Exhibit 3. Thus, the evidence clearly shows that 
defendant did not intend that deposit to cover Julie's check. See R. 184:86-87, 97-98, 
153-54. 
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In any event, on appeal defendant concedes that he wrote too many checks and that 
he knew some of those checks would not be paid. See Br. of Aplt. at 23. It was for that 
reason that defendant warned his employees not to cash their checks immediately. See R. 
184:58, 61-62. Although defendant may have believed that the funds would eventually 
be sufficient to cover Julie's paychecks, he knew that the funds were insufficient at the 
time he issued the checks. Accordingly, where the clear weight of the evidence supports 
trial court's judgment, defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails. See 
Rothe, 2000 UT App 277, f 4. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO SHOW THAT UTAH'S BAD 
CHECK STATUTE, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-505(1) IS 
UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
Defendant next claims that Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) is unconstitutional. See 
Br. of Aplt. at 23-26, 31-32, 36-37. Defendant's constitutional challenge is essentially 
threefold: (1) in Point I subsection D and Point III subsection C of his brief, defendant 
claims that section 76-6-505(1) violates Art. I § 16 of the Utah Constitution's prohibition 
against imprisonment for debt, see Br. of Aplt. at 23-25, 36-37; (2) in Point II subsection 
C of his brief, defendant claims that section 76-6-505(1) is void for vagueness, see Br. of 
Aplt. at 31-32; and (3) in Point III subsection D of his brief, defendant claims that in 
general section 76-6-505 violates his due process rights because it punishes him 
individually for acting in "a representative capacity," see Br. of Aplt. at 37. Defendant's 
claims lack merit. 
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"'In determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed to be constitutional until 
the contrary is clearly shown." Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994) 
(quoting In re Estate ofBaer, 562 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1977)). Accordingly, "'[ejvery 
reasonable presumption must be indulged in and every reasonable doubt resolved in favor 
of constitutionality.5" Id. See also Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317-18 (Utah 
1983) (holding that statutes "are endowed with a strong presumption of validity; and that 
they should not be declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis upon which 
they can be found to come within the constitutional frame work [sic]") (quotations 
omitted). "Those challenging the constitutionality of a statute bear the burden of 
demonstrating its unconstitutionality." State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 54, f 21,975 P.2d 
489. 
A. Where the legislative purpose of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) is to prevent 
the circulation of worthless commercial paper, defendant fails to show that 
the statute violates Utah's constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for 
debt. 
In both Point I subsection D and Point III subsection C of his brief, defendant 
claims that section 76-6-505(1) violates art. I, § 16 of the Utah Constitution. See Br. of 
Aplt. at 23-25, 36-37. That article states "[t]here shall be no imprisonment for debt 
except in cases of absconding debtors " Utah Const, art. I, § 16. Essentially, defendant 
claims that section 76-6-505(1) unconstitutionally imposes punishment for the collection 
of a debt. See Br. of Aplt. at 23-25, 36-37. Defendant's claim is frivolous. 
Here, defendant was prosecuted not for being in debt, but for issuing bad checks. 
Had he been in debt and not issued any bad checks, he would not have been prosecuted. 
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In Commonwealth v. Mutnik, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered this 
issue. 406 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1979). Like the instant case, Mutnik involved a constitutional 
challenge to Pennsylvania's bad check statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4105 (2000), under a 
provision of the Pennsylvania Constitution prohibiting imprisonment for debt. Id. at 519. 
Mutnik, a corporate officer, knowingly issued a bad check on behalf of his company for 
the payment of an existing past-due account. Id. at 517. There, the court held that 
"[n]either case law nor the language of the constitutional provision precludes the 
imprisonment of one who knowingly passes a bad check." Id. at 519. Rather, the court 
declared that Mutnik was being punished for intentionally disrupting the flow of and 
undermining the soundness of commercial paper in Pennsylvania. Id. 
. . . In defining the crime as a passing of a bad check knowing that it would 
be dishonored, regardless of consideration, the legislature did not evolve or 
proclaim indebtedness as a crime, but rather proclaimed it a crime for 
anyone to issue a bad check regardless of whether present consideration 
flows. The purpose of this statute is not to imprison debtors but to protect 
against impairment of commercial transactions. Most business today is 
conducted by the use of checks and, as such, checks have assumed virtually 
the same value as governmental currency. As such, the legislature has 
declared it a crime for anyone to impugn or impair such a document 
regardless of the nature of the transaction in which it is passed. This we 
believe to be within the parameters of the police power of the legislature 
and we find no impairment to the constitutionality of such act. 
Id. (citation and quotations omitted). On those grounds, the Mutnik court declared that 
Pennsylvania's bad check statute was constitutional. Id. 
Pennsylvania's bad check statute is extremely similar to section 76-6-505(1) in 
providing that "[a] person commits an offense if he issues or passes a check or similar 
sight order for the payment of money, knowing that it will not be honored by the drawee." 
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Compare Pa. Stat. Ann. § 4105 (2000) with Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-505(1) (1999). Like 
the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Utah Constitution does not prohibit imprisonment of 
one who knowingly issues a bad check. See Utah Const, art. I, § 16. Moreover, as shown 
in Point I subsection A above, the plain language of section 76-6-505(1) reveals that the 
Legislature's purpose for enacting the statute is the same as that purpose noted in Mutnik. 
Accordingly, where section 76-6-505(1) was enacted to prevent the perversion of the flow 
of commercial paper and not for use as a collection tool, defendant's challenge to the 
constitutionality of the statute fails. 
B. Given the clarity of the requisite criminal conduct under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-505(1) and the presumption of constitutionality, defendant fails to show 
that the statute is unconstitutionally vague. 
Claiming that section 76-6-505(1) is void for vagueness, in Point II subsection C 
of his brief defendant argues that the statute creates "an unexpected dichotomy between 
bad checks written to pay for goods and bad checks written to pay for services." Br. of 
Aplt. at 31-32. Specifically, defendant claims that the language of section 76-6-505(1) 
does not provide notice that one may not be prosecuted for paying a pre-existing debt for 
goods obtained, and will be prosecuted for paying a pre-existing debt for services 
rendered. See id. This claim is frivolous. 
"The void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a statute or ordinance define an 
'offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is 
prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory 
enforcement.'" State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 927 (Utah App. 1991) (citing 
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Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983)). "More important than actual notice is 
'the requirement that a legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law 
enforcement.'" Id. (citations omitted). Accordingly, "4[i]t is a basic principle of due 
process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly 
defined.'" Id. (citing Groyned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,108 (1972)). However, 
'"in determining constitutionality, statutes are presumed to be constitutional until the 
contrary is clearly shown.'" Ohms, 881 P.2d at 847 (citation omitted). 
Defendant's claim fails because section 76-6-505(1) clearly proscribes passing a 
bad check "for the purpose of... paying for any . . . wages [.]" Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-
505(1) (1999). Defendant fails to explain how any reasonable person could fail to 
understand what this language forbids. No language in the statute limits its reach to bad 
checks issued to pay for services not yet performed on the date of issuance. See id. 
Therefore, defendant has failed to overcome the presumption against unconstitutionality 
and show that section 76-6-505(1) is unconstitutionally vague. See Ohms, 881 P.2d at 
847. 
C. Because Utah law holds a corporate officer responsible for his criminal acts 
taken on behalf of his company, defendant fails to show that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-505 violates his due process rights. 
Finally, in Point III subsection D of his brief, defendant claims that in general 
section 76-6-505 violates his due process rights because it punishes him for Cornerstone's 
actions. See Br. of Aplt. at 37. Essentially, defendant argues that as a corporate officer of 
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Cornerstone, he cannot be held liable for the corporation's bad acts. See id. Defendant's 
claim is both inadequately briefed and fiajrolous. 
(1) Defendant's claim is inadequately briefed. 
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, provides that "[t]he argument shall 
contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented .. 
. with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9). In the instant case, defendant whole argument consists of little more than a 
third of a page. See Br. of Aplt. at 37. Defendant cites no cases, no constitutional 
provisions, and offers no analysis. See id. Given defendant's complete failure to brief 
this issue, this Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim. See State v. Jaeger, 
1999 UT 1,131,973 P.2d 404 (refusing to address an inadequately briefed constitutional 
argument). 
(2) Utah law clearly states that defendant is responsible for his criminal 
conduct committed in Cornerstone's name. 
Notwithstanding defendant's failure to adequately brief his claim, defendant's 
claim fails under Utah law. Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-205 states that "[a] person is 
criminally liable for conduct constituting an offense which he performs or causes to be 
performed in the name of or on behalf of a corporation or association to the same extent 
as if such conduct were performed in his own name or behalf." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
205 (1999). Moreover, the term "person" as found in section 76-6-505 is defined under 
the criminal code as either "an individual [or] public or private corporation[.]" Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-1-601 (1999). Accordingly, under Utah law, as the acting president of 
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Cornerstone, and the only individual authorized to sign checks on Cornerstone's behalf, 
defendant is criminally liable for issuing bad paychecks to Julie, knowing that there were 
insufficient funds in Cornerstone's account to cover those checks. See id.; Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-205 (1999); R. 184:15-16, 150, 162. 
POINT IV 
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT THE TRIAL COURT 
ERRED BY NOT ALLOWING HIM TO USE HIS 
DISCLOSURE TO THE VICTIM AS A DEFENSE, IS 
BOTH INADEQUATELY BRIEFED AND FLAWED 
In Point IV of his brief, Defendant claims that the trial court erred by not allowing 
him to present his disclosure to Julie that the checks may not clear, as a defense. See Br. 
of Aplt at 37-38. Defendant's claim is both inadequately briefed and fundamentally 
flawed. 
A. Defendant fails to adequately brief his claim. 
"It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are 
not adequately briefed." State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 924,926 (Utah App. 1998). See Utah 
R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ('The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented . . . with citations to the authorities, statutes, 
and parts of the record relied on."). Here, defendant's argument is cursory at best and 
fails to offer any analysis or support for his claims. See Br. of Aplt. at 37-38. Defendant 
superficially treats his claim in only one-half page of text. See id. Cf. State v. Lucero, 
2002 UT App 135, fj 12-15, 47 P.3d 107 (finding a single-issue argument consisting of 
only six pages to be inadequately briefed). Further, the argument includes only two cases 
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and two references to Am. Jur. 2d, all of which are summarily cited and wholly 
unexplained. See Br. of Aplt. at 37-38. Defendant provides no analysis or application of 
the legal principles contained in those cases to the present facts. See id.; see also State v. 
Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998) (Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) "requires not just bald 
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that 
authority."). In essence, defendant impermissibly treats this Court as '"a depository in 
which [he] dump[s] the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 
439,450 (Utah 1988) (citation omitted). Accordingly, where defendant's claim is 
inadequately briefed, it need not be addressed by this Court. See Parra, 972 P.2d at 926. 
B. Defendant's defense is flawed in that it is not absolute. 
Irrespective of defendant's failure to brief his claim, defendant's defense also fails 
because it is not absolute. Defendant claims that at the time he issued the paychecks to 
Julie, he disclosed the "potential problems" with the checks. Br. of Aplt. at 38. However, 
that issue was contested at trial. The record indicates that Julie acknowledged that 
defendant had asked her not to cash check 172 and instructed her to deposit it instead, but 
she could not recall receiving any instructions when check 191 was issued. See R. 
184:58, 60-62. The record further indicates that the trial court found Julie to be the more 
credible witness. See R. 184:205; see also State v. Johnson, 111 P.2d 326, 327 (Utah 
App. 1989) (stating that because '"the truth is rarely pure and never simple,"' the trial 
judge is in the best position to sift witness credibility and the accuracy of conflicting 
evidence.") (citations omitted); State v. Pierce, 111 P.2d 780, 781-82 (Utah 1986) (stating 
29 
that "[t]he fact finder is free to weigh the conflicting evidence presented and to draw its 
own conclusions"). Thus, even if the trial court were to find that defendant's claim was 
valid with regard to check 172, he could still have been convicted for issuing check 191. 
Cf. State v. Elton, 680 P.2d 727, 731-32 (Utah 1984). Accordingly, where defendant's 
defense does not apply to both paychecks, it fails. 
Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that his defense is incomplete, defendant failed 
to pay check 172 even after Julie followed his instructions. See R. 184:34-36. Therefore, 
defendant's "disclosure defense" is also invalid against check 172. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm 
defendant's conviction for issuing a bad check. 
Dated this jfl^day of January, 2003. 
MARKL.SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
S-£&c^~*-~-
JEFFREY T. COLEMERE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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76-6-503. Iaauing a bad check or draft — Presumption. 
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of 
money, for the purpose of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money; property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wages, salary; labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid by the drawee 
and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft. 
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for 
which payment ia reftised by tha drawee ia presumed to know the check or 
draft would not bo paid if ha had no account with tha drawee at the time of 
issue. 
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for tha payment of 
money, for tha purpoee of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or 
corporation, any money, property, or other thing of value or paying for any 
services, wagee, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which chads or draft is 
legally reftised by the drawee, ia guilty of iaauing a bad check or draft if he fails 
to make good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused 
check or draft within 14 days of his receiving actual notice of the check or 
draft's nonpayment 
(3) An offenee of iaauing a bad check or draft shall be punished aa follows: 
(a) If tha check or draft or striae of checks or drafts made or drawn in 
this state within a period not exceeding six months amounta to a sum that 
ia leee than $300, the ofihnae ia a class B misdemeanor. 
(b) If the check or draft or diecka or drafta made or drawn in this sU 
within a period not streeding six months amounta to a sum that ia or 
exceeds $300 but ia leee than $1,000, the offtnee ia a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Ifthedieckordraftor<&ecksordraftemadeordrawn 
within a period not streeding six moothe amounta to a sum that ia or 
exceeds $ 1,000 but ia leee than $5,000, tha offenee ia a felony of the third 
degree. 
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this sUte 
within a period not streeding six moothe amounta to a sum that ia or 
exceoda $6,000, tha oAoee ia a second degree felony. 
76-2-204. Criminal responsibility of corporation or asso-
ciation. 
A corporation or association is guilty of an offense when: 
(1) The conduct constituting the offense consists of an omission to 
discharge a specific duty of affirmative performance imposed on corpora-
tions or associations by law; or 
(2) The conduct constituting the offense is authorized, solicited, re-
quested, commanded, or undertaken, performed, or recklessly tolerated by 
the board of directors or by a high managerial agent acting within the 
scope of his employment and in behalf of the corporation or association. 
76-2-103. Definitions. 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally; or with intent or willftdly with respect to thenatureof 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantia], and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under ail the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
76.1-601. Definitions. 
Unless otherwise provided, the following terms apply to this title: 
(1) "Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
(2) "Actor" means a person whose criminal responsibility is in issue in 
a criminal action. 
(3) "Bodily injury" means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of 
physical condition. 
(4) "Conduct19 means an act or omission. 
(5) "Dangerous weapon* means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of the item leads 
the victim to reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death 
or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or in any other 
manner that he is in control of such an item. 
(6) "Offense19 means a violation of any penal statute of this state. 
(7) "Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty to act 
and the actor is capable of acting. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, public or private corporation, govern-
ment, partnership, or unincorporated association. 
(9) "Possess" means to have physical possession of or to exercise 
dominion or control over tangible property. 
(10) "Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes 
serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
death. 
(11) "Substantial bodily iiyury" means bodily injury, not amounting to 
serious bodily injury, that creates or causes protracted physical pain, 
temporary disfigurement, or temporary loss or impairment of the function 
of any bodily member or organ. 
(12) "Writing" or "written" includes any handwriting, typewriting, 
printing, electronic storage or transmission, or any other method of 
recording information or fixing information in a form capable of being 
preserved. 
76-1-106. Strict construction rule not applicable. 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
Rule 24. Briefs-
fa) Brief of the appellant. The brief of the appellant shall contain under 
appropriate headings and in the order indicated: 
(DA complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or agency 
whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except where the caption of 
the case on appeal contains the names of all such parties. The list should be set 
out on a separate page which appears immediately inside the cover. 
(2) A table of contents, including the contents of the addendum, with page 
references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, rules, statutes and other authorities cited, with references to 
the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of the appellate court 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review, including for each issue: 
the standard of appellate review with supporting authority; and 
(A) citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial 
court; or 
(B) a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in 
the trial court 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and. regulations 
whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central importance to 
the appeal shall be set out verbatim with the appropriate citation. If the 
pertinent part of the provision is lengthy, the citation alone will suffice, and the 
provision shall be set forth in an addendum to the brief under paragraph (11) 
of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the cam. The statement shall first indicate briefly the 
nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court 
below. A statement of the facts relevant to the issuee presented for review shall 
follow. All statements of fact and references to the proceedings below shall be 
supported by citations to the record in accordance with paragraph (e) of this 
rule. 
(8) Summary of arguments The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually made 
in the body of the brief! It shall not be a mere repetition of the heading under 
which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of 
the appellant with respect to the issuee presented, including the grounds for 
reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial court, with citations to the 
authorities, statute*, and parts of the record relied on. A party challenging a 
fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged 
finding. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought 
(11) An addendum to the brief or a statement that no addendum is necessary 
under this paragraph. The addendum shall be bound as part of the brief unless 
doing so makes the brief unreasonably thick. If the addendum is bound 
separately, the addendum shall contain a table of contents. The addendum 
shall contain a copy of: 
(A) any constitutional provision, statute, rule, or regulation of central 
importance cited in the brief bvit not reproduced verbatim in the brief; 
(B) in cases being reviewed on certiorari, a copy of the Court of Appeals 
opinion; in all cases any court opinion of central importance to the appeal but 
not available to the court as part of a regularly published reporter service; and 
(C) those parts of the record on appeal that are of central importance to the 
determination of the appeal, such as the challenged instructions, findings of 
fact and conclusions of law, memorandum decision, the transcript of the court's 
oral decision, or the contract or document subject to construction. 
(b) Brief of the appellee. The brief of the appellee shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a) of this rule, except that the appellee need not 
include: 
( D a statement of the issues or of the case unless the appellee is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant; or 
(2) an addendum, except to provide material not included in the addendum 
of the appellant The appellee may refer to the addendum of the appellant. 
(c) Reply brief. The appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the . 
appellee, and if the appellee has cross-appealed, the appellee may file a brief in 
reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the cross-
appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set forth in 
the opposing brief The content of the reply brief shall conform to the 
requirements of paragraph (a)(2), (3), (9), and (10) of this rule. No further 
briefii may be filed except with leave of the appellate court 
(d) References in briefii to partite. Counsel will be expected in their briefii 
and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant* and "appellee.* It promotee clarity to use the 
designations used in the lower wart or in the agency proceedings, or the actual 
namee of partiee, or deecripttve terms such as "the employee,9 "the injured 
person," "die taxpayer/ etc 
(e) Refkrtncee in briefs to the record. References shall be made to the pages 
of the original record as paginated pursuant to Rule 1Kb) or to pages of any 
statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement prepared 
pursuant to Rule 11(f) or 11(g). References to pages of published depositions or 
transcripts shall identify the sequential number of the cover page of each 
volume as marked by the clerk on the bottom right corner and each separately 
numbered page(s) referred to within the deposition or transcript as marked by 
the transcriber. References to exhibits shall be made to the exhibit numbers. If 
reference is made to evidence the admissibility of which is in controversy, 
reference shall be made to the pages of the record at which the evidence was 
identified* offered* and received or rejected. 
(0 Length of briefs. Except by permission of the court, principal briefs shall 
not exceed 50 pages, and reply briefii shall not exceed 25 pages, exclusive of 
pages containing the table of contents, tables of citations and any addendum 
containing statutee, rules, regulations, or portions of the record as required by 
paragraph (a) of this rule. In cases involving cross-appeals, paragraph (g) of 
this rule sets forth the length of briefs. 
(g) Briefs in cases involving cross*appeals. If a cross-appeal is filed, the party 
first filing a notice of appeal shall be deemed the appellant for the purposes of 
this rule and Rule 26, unless the parties otherwise agree or the court otherwise 
orders. The brief of the appellant shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The brief 
of the appellee/cross-appellant shall contain the issues and arguments in-
volved in the cross-appeal as well as the answer to the brief of the appellant 
and shall not exceed 50 pages in length. The appellant shall then file a brief 
which contains an answer to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross* 
appellant and a reply to the appellee's response to the issues raised in the 
appellant's opening brief. The appellant's second brief shall not exceed 25 
pages in length. The appellee/cross-appellant may then file a second brief, not 
to exceed 25 pages in length, which contains only a reply to the appellant's 
answers to the original issues raised by the appellee/cross-appellant's first 
brief. The lengths specified by this rule are exclusive of table of contents, table 
of authorities, and addenda and may be exceeded only by permission of the 
court. The court shall grant reasonable requests, for good cause shown. 
(h) Briefs in cases involving multiple appellant* or appellees. In cases 
involving more than one appellant or appellee, including cases consolidated for 
purposes of the appeal, any number of either may join in a single brief, and any 
appellant or appellee may adopt by reference any part of the brief of another 
Parties may similarly join in reply briefs. 
(i) Citation of supplemental authorities. When pertinent and significant 
authorities come to the attention of a party after that party's brief has been 
filed, or after oral argument but before decision, a party may promptly advise 
the clerk of the appellate court, by letter setting forth the citations. An original 
letter and nine copies shall be filed in the Supreme Court An original letter 
and seven copies shall be filed in the Court of Appeals. There shall be a 
reference either to the page of the brief or to a point argued orally to which the 
citations pertain; but die letter shall without argument state the reasons for 
the supplemental citations. Any response shall be made within 7 days of filing 
and shall be similarly limited. 
(j) Requirements and sanctions. All briefs under this rule must be concise, 
presented with accuracy, logically arranged with proper headings and free 
from burdensome, irrelevant, immaterial or scandalous matters. Briefs which 
are not in compliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte 
by the court, and the court may assess attorney fees against the offending 
lawyer. 
(k) Brief covers. The covers of all briefs shall be of heavy cover stock and 
shall comply with Rule 27. 
(Amended effective October 1,1992; July 1,1994; April 1,1995; April 1,1998; 
November 1,1999.) 





1. (Inherent and inalionabla rights.] 
2. (All political powtr inharont in tha paopla.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from tha Union.) 
4. (Raligioui Libarty — No proparty qualifica-
tion to vota or hold offica.J 
5. [Habaaa corpue.) 
6. [Right to baar anna.] 
7. [Dua proceee of law.] 
8. [Offanssa bailable.] 
9. [Exceeaive bail and finaa — Crual puniah-
mente.) 
10. [Trial by jury] 
11. [Courta open — Redrea* of ixyuriee.) 
12. [Righta or accusad parsona.] 
13. [Proascutioa by intonation or indictment 
— Grand jury.] 
14. [Unraaaooabie aeaithes forbidden — Iaae» 
anca of warrant] 
Section 
15. [Frtadom of ipooch and of tha prtao — Li-
bal.] 
16. [No imprisonmant for dabt — Exception.] 
17. [Election! to ba fraa — Soldiers voting.] 
18. [Attainder—E* postfocfcolawe — Impair-
ing contracts.] 
19. [Treaaon defined — Proof] 
20. [Military subordinate to tha civil power.] 
21. (Slavery forbidden.] 
22. (Private property for public use.] 
23. [Irrevocable franchiaaa forbidden.) 
24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
25. [Righta retained by paopla.] 
26. [Proviaiooe mandatory and prohibitory.] 
27. (Fundamental rights.] 
Sec* 16. [No imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
There shell be no imprisonment for debt except in caeee of absconding 
debtors. 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
1 AND THERE ARE TIMES IN OUR LIFE THAT COMING UP WITH $2,000 CAN 
2 BE QUITE DIFFICULT, BUT IT'S NOT IMPOSSIBLE. IT'S NOT 
3 IMPOSSIBLE IN OUR SOCIETY, IN OUR CULTURE FOR AN EDUCATED MAN 
4 WITH DILIGENT EFFORT TO LOCATE, BORROW — I'M NOT GOING TO 
5 SUGGEST STEALING ~ BUT BORROW OR OTHERWISE LOCATING FUNDS 
6 LEGITIMATELY. AND IT WAS RECKLESS FOR HIM TO ALLOW THE CHECKS 
7 AND THEN NOT BE MORE DILIGENT TO GET THEM COVERED. 
8 TBI COURT: THANK YOU. THOUGH I'VE LISTENED 
9 CAREFULLY TO THE EVIDENCE AS IT CAME IN. I'VE LISTENED 
10 CAREFULLY TO YOUR ARGUMENTS AS YOU PRESENTED THEM. I'M AWARE 
11 OF THE STATUTE AND I'M AWARE OF THE COURT'S REVIEWING PRIOR 
12 TO TODAY'S TRIAL. 
13 I THINK I'M PROBABLY IN AS GOOD A POSITION RIGHT NOW AS I 
14 WILL BE AT ANY TIME TO MAKE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS REGARDING 
15 THE EVIDENCE THAT I HAVE RECEIVED. IT'S FRESH IN MY MIND NOW 
16 AS IT WILL EVER BE. 
17 MY BEST VIEW OF THIS, FOLKS, IS THAT, FIRST OF ALL, I 
18 THINK IT IS FAIR TO SAY AS COUNSEL'S ARGUED THAT MR. HOPKINS 
19 IS A VERY INTELLIGENT MAN, VERY HIGHLY EDUCATED, IS A VERY 
20 EXPERIENCED BUSINESSMAN BASED ON HIS TESTIMONY. AND MY BEST 
21 VIEW IS THAT AS PRESIDENT OF THIS CORPORATION HE WAS 
22 RESPONSIBLE — THE PERSON RESPONSIBLE FOR THE ISSUANCE OR 
23 PASSING OF THESE PAYROLL CHECKS. 
24 NOW, UNDER THE FACTS OF THIS CASE AND UNDER THE LAW 
25 THAT'S SET OUT IN 76-2-205, I FIND THAT IN THAT CAPACITY HE 
205 
WAS THE PERSON WHO ISSUED OR PASSED EACH OF THESE CHECKS, HAD 
AUTHORITY TO ISSUE OR PASS THEM. AND AS THE AGENT OF THE 
CORPORATION DID IT, EVEN WITH REGARD TO THAT CHECK THAT MAY BE 
HIS DAUGHTER-IN-LAW'S SIGNATURE AS HE'S TESTIFIED, THAT 
ULTIMATELY IT WAS HE WHO ISSUED AND PASSED THAT CHECK FOR 
PAYROLL THAT WAS HONESTLY DUE AND OWING IN AN AMOUNT THAT WAS 
THE APPROPRIATE AMOUNT FOR A PERIOD OF TIME IT WAS AFTER. 
THE PURPOSE OF EACH OF THE CHECKS AT ISSUE WAS A PURPOSE 
SET OUT IN 76-505-1 AND 2; THAT IS, PAYING FOR WAGES, SALARY, 
LABOR. AND WITH REGARD TO SUBSECTION 2, THE ISSUE IS WHETHER 
HE KNEW IT WOULD NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE. AND AS I REVIEW 
STATE'S EXHIBITS 1, 2, AND 3, THE BANK STATEMENTS THAT SHOW 
NUMEROUS BOUNCED CHECKS IN DECEMBER, JANUARY AND FEBRUARY, AS 
I REVIEW THE TESTIMONY THAT — THAT NUMEROUS EMPLOYEES WERE 
TOLD THAT, YOU KNOW, DON'T TRY TO CASH THIS. JUST DEPOSIT IT. 
WE'RE CONFIDENT IT WILL PASS. THAT SHOWED KNOWLEDGE THAT 
THERE WAS A PROBLEM. AND I THINK IT'S SUFFICIENT TO SHOW 
KNOWLEDGE THAT ANY GIVEN CHECK MAY NOT BE PAID BY THE DRAWEE. 
THERE SEEMED TO BE A SUGGESTION THAT THE CRIME WAS 
COMMITTED BY THE EMPLOYEES FOR NOT FOLLOWING STRICTLY THE 
DIRECTIONS OF DEPOSITING THEM RATHER THAN TRYING TO CASH THEM 
OR WAITING SOME TIME BEFORE THEY DEPOSIT THEM. AND I GUESS I 
JUST DON'T SEE IT THAT WAY. 
IT'S CLEAR WITH REGARD TO THESE TWO CHECKS, THEY WERE 
REFUSED BY THE DRAWEE AND THE DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT WAS KNOWING. 
^
u o 
1 IT WAS ALSO EXTREMELY RECKLESS WITH REGARD TO THE STATE OF THE' 
2 BUSINESS AS TESTIFIED TO DURING THE TIME AT ISSUE, FEBRUARY OF 
3 2001. AND I FIND THAT ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 1 OF 
4 76-6-505 HAVE BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
5 WITH REGARD TO 2, WE'VE ALREADY COVERED SOME OF THE 
6 ELEMENTS, AND WE DROP DOWN TO THE ISSUE OF WHETHER HE LATER 
7 RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN MADE GOOD. 
8 AND I DO FIND THAT WITH REGARD TO EACH OF THESE TWO CHECKS HE 
9 HAD RECEIVED ACTUAL NOTICE OF THE CHECK'S NONPAYMENT. WITH 
10 REGARD TO THE EARLIER CHECK, NOTICE CAME FROM A LETTER BY 
11 AMERICA FIRST CREDIT UNION. WITH REGARD TO BOTH OF THE 
12 CHECKS, THERE WAS NOTICE PROVIDED BY THE EMPLOYEE, MISS 
13 VANISI, THAT THE CHECKS HAD NOT BEEN PAID. AND I ACCEPT YOUR 
14 TESTIMONY WITH REGARD TO THAT, AND MAKE IT FINDINGS OF THE 
15 COURT. 
16 HAVING THAT NOTICE, HE KNOWINGLY AND RECKLESSLY FAILED TO 
17 MAKE GOOD FOR PAYMENT WITHIN THE 14 DAYS ALLOWED UNDER THE 
18 STATUTE. AND I FIND ALL OF THE ELEMENTS OF SUBSECTION 2 HAVE 
19 BEEN SHOWN BY PROOF BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. 
20 BASED ON THOSE FINDINGS AND IN LIGHT OF THE AMENDED 
21 INFORMATION THAT IS FILED BY THE STATE, I DO FIND THAT THERE 
22 HAS BEEN A SINGLE VIOLATION OF 76-6-505 AND WILL ENTER A 
23 JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION TO A THIRD-DEGREE FELONY BASED ON THAT. 
24 I WILL SET SENTENCING IN THE MATTER — LET'S SEE. 
25 MR. DRAKE, HAVE YOU GOT YOUR CALENDAR WITH YOU? 
